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1 Introduction
The case for flexible exchange rates rests on the ability of monetary policy to adjust its
stance and let the exchange rate depreciate or appreciate in response to shocks. Hence,
even economies with floating exchange rates may suffer a great deal as a consequence of
large external shocks, if monetary policy becomes constrained by the the zero lower bound
(ZLB) on interest rates. Although the nature of ZLB constraint is quite different from that
implied by an exchange rate peg or participation in a currency union, the implications for
macroeconomic resilience in the face of external socks are potentially severe.
This has been illustrated forcefully during the great recession. Figure 1 shows the evolution
of output and exchange rates in the Scandinavian countries during the great recession. Two
of these countries have given up exchange rate flexibility: Finland is a member of the euro
area; Denmark operates an independent currency, but maintains a narrow peg to the euro.
The other two, Sweden and Norway, pursue inflation targeting, but only in Sweden fell policy
rates to the ZLB in 2009–10. The left panel shows a sizeable output contraction for Finland
and Denmark, but not for Norway. The contraction in Sweden, in turn, is much larger than
in Norway and, in fact, as strong as in Denmark and Finland. The right panel shows that
the Norwegian Krone and the Swedish Krona both depreciated sharply during the first year
of the crisis, but initially the depreciation was even stronger in Norway.
In this paper, we reassess the ability of the exchange rate to act as shock absorber from the
vantage point of a small open economy facing a great recession, during which demand and
inflation in the rest of the world collapse. We do so by carrying out a comparative analysis
of stabilization policy across exchange rate regimes, explicitly accounting for constraints on
monetary policy—be it the ZLB or an exchange rate peg—but also for the monetary-fiscal
policy mix. Indeed, it is well understood that an effective fiscal policy requires an adequate
degree of monetary accommodation (see, e.g, Woodford, 2011), that may or may not be
granted in the absence of exchange rate flexibility, or with policy rates at the zero lower
bound.
We find that during a global great recession the case for flexible exchange rates in a small
open economy is actually stronger than classic arguments suggest. Provided that the central
bank is not constrained in pursuing its inflation objective, the role of floating rates as a shock
absorber vis-a`-vis an adverse shock to global demand is twofold. First, real depreciation
counteracts the fall in net exports driven by the contraction of external demand. Second,
additional, sustained depreciation decouples domestic prices from the deflationary crawl in
the rest of the world.
Moreover, floating rates continue to be beneficial even if the external shock is so large that
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Figure 1: Real GDP (left) and end-of-quarter exchange rate (price of euro in local currency)
in selected economies. Sample period: 2007Q4–2012Q4. GDP is normalized to 100 Percent
in 2007Q4, the exchange rate is expressed in percentage change relative to 2007Q4. Source:
OECD Economic Outlook 98 and Bundesbank.
domestic policy rates become constrained by the ZLB. Anticipating a future monetary expan-
sion, the Home exchange rate still depreciates (although less than in the unconstrained case),
thereby providing some isolation from the adverse developments in the rest of the world. In
addition, floating exchange rates allow fiscal stimulus to become very effective precisely when
monetary policy can deliver less stabilization—a “benign coincidence.”
The opposite holds in case of a fixed exchange rate regime. Lack of exchange rate flexibility
not only exposes the economy fully to the adverse consequences of the external demand shock.
It also amplifies the transmission of a global great recession by anchoring the domestic price
level to the foreign deflationary crawl. This, in turn, pushes up domestic real interest rates
and induces a collapse of internal demand. Last but not least, an exchange rate peg prevents
fiscal policy from having a significant and persistent effects on domestic inflation, as it remains
tied to inflation abroad. At odds with the received wisdom, fiscal policy is not necessarily
more effective in a fixed exchange rate. The benign coincidence breaks down.
We establish these results analytically in a stylized framework as well as through model
simulations. To state our results as clearly as possible, we build on the workhorse monetary
model of a small open economy in its standard New Keynesian specification.1 Throughout
our analysis, we posit a large rise in world preferences for current savings. This shock causes
a sustained drop in rest-of-the world demand and rest-of-the world deflation, because it can
not be offset by appropriate monetary policy measures in the rest of the world. The exchange
1In the new Keynesian specification, a small open economy takes the global equilibrium as given but
maintains some monopoly power on its terms of trade—see, for instance, Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and De
Paoli (2009) which, in turn, build the New Open Economy Macroeoconomics literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff,
1996).
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rate regime, in turn, is essential in determining to what extent the Home economy remains
insulated from both the real drag from the rest-of-the world and the deflationary pressure.
To verify the robustness of our findings to varying the degree of capital market integration
and financial frictions, in the last part of the paper we rely on model extensions that captures
financial imperfections. Building on previous work of ours (Corsetti et al., 2013b), we consider
economies with limited risk sharing and vulnerable to sovereign risk crises, which may spillover
on borrowing costs and conditions faced by the private sector. We find that, per effect of
external shock, sovereign risk per se may exacerbate the negative effects of a recessionary
external shock only at the margin. Yet, it causes fiscal policy to become much less effective
in stabilizing economic activity exactly when monetary policy is constrained, particularly so
under a peg.
Our paper relates to a number of studies which started to reassess the costs and benefits
of flexible exchange rates in light of recent developments. In line with Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2015) we show that macroeconomic adjustment is indeed particularly painful under a
currency peg. The mechanisms, though, differ. Whereas we highlight the lack of effectiveness
of both monetary and fiscal stabilization policy, they see wage-setting frictions as the central
element. Krugman (2014) emphasizes the benefits of flexible exchange rates in the face of
sovereign risk. The paper in the literature closest to ours is Cook and Devereux (2014). They
show within a two-country model that a flexible exchange rate regime can make an economy
more, rather than less, vulnerable to a large shock. The main difference to our work is the
focus and main questions in the analysis. Whereas we focus on the transmission of a large
adverse external shock to a small open economy, they focus on the domestic stabilization of
a large domestic demand shock shock.2
Finally, a number of recent studies have emphasized that fiscal policy is particularly effective
in stabilizing open economies, once monetary policy becomes constrained by the ZLB (Cook
and Devereux, 2011; Erceg and Linde´, 2012). That the effectiveness of fiscal policy is limited,
on the other hand, under an exchange rate peg has been highlighted by earlier studies (Corsetti
et al., 2013a; Farhi and Werning, 2012).3 In the present paper we reconsider those findings
in circumstances where a need for effective stabilization arises in the first place.
The text is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model by focusing on a log-linear
approximation of the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 provides a number of closed-form
2Cook and Devereux (2013) study the case for international policy coordination if in one of two countries
monetary policy becomes constrained by the zero lower bound. As regards empirical work Berkmen et al.
(2012) document evidence that exchange-rate flexibility seems to have mitigated the adverse impact of the
Great Recession.
3Erceg and Linde´ (2012), however, highlight the importance of price rigidities for the relative size of the
government spending multiplier at the ZLB and under an exchange rate peg.
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results on the transmission and stabilization of a great recession under alternative policy
scenarios in the small open economy. Section 4 illustrates the quantitative relevance of these
results through model simulations. It also provides results for a modified environment with
financial friction and sovereign risk. Section 5 concludes.
2 A New Keynesian small open-economy model
We frame our analysis in the standard New Keynesian model, using a version of the two-
country model put forward in Corsetti et al. (2012). Both countries produce a variety of
country-specific intermediate goods, with the number of intermediate good producers in the
world normalized to unity. While international financial markets are complete, goods market
integration is incomplete due to home bias. Hence, while we assume that the law of one price
holds at the level of intermediate goods, purchasing power parity fails in the short run. The
countries have isomorphic structures, but may differ in terms of size, policies and shocks.
We build a scenario in which a small open economy faces a great recession in the rest of
the world. For this purpose we make the following assumptions. First, the size of Home in
the world economy approaches zero, while the rest of the world is consolidated in Foreign.
As a result, Home behaves like a small open economy, while Foreign behaves like a closed
economy.4 Second, the only source of variation at the world-level is a Foreign “saving shock”.
This shock effectively alters the time-discount factor. Such preference shocks often-times are
used to model an exogenous variation of the intertemporal allocation of private expenditures
(for a textbook treatment see Gali, 2015). For the effect of the shock on the Home economy,
one needs to know the effect of the shock on Foreign demand and prices. We shall, third,
assume that the shock in Foreign occurs when monetary policy in Foreign is unable to contain
its effect.
Importantly, while our focus is on Home, we are explicit about the dynamics in Foreign so
that the external shock which impacts Home is fully micro-founded. As a result we may
account for the cross-equations restrictions of the model along two dimensions. First, the
saving shock in Foreign impacts Home not only via goods markets, but also via financial
markets.5 Second, the model restricts the joint dynamics of output and inflation in Foreign
during a great recession. As we shall see both of these matter for Home.
The structure of the model that we use is well-known. We give a detailed description in
4In this case Home is identical to the small open economy of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), except for the fact
that we allow for government consumption and restrict preferences to log-utility.
5The global fall in demand (including the demand for the Home output), and the adjustment in the world
interest rate and the price of foreign exports are all taken as given by the small open economy. Because of the
fluctuation in the relative price of Home to Foreign consumption, however, full insurance via complete markets
does not insulate Home consumption from the external shock.
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Appendix A. In the following, instead, we provide a compact exposition, based on a log-
linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions around a deterministic and symmetric,
zero-inflation steady state. Output is normalized to one. In both the appendix and the text,
Foreign variables are indexed with a star. Variables carry a time-subscript, t. Variables
without a hat refer to log deviations from the steady state. Variables that carry a hat refer to
deviations in levels. We begin with Foreign and discuss the equilibrium conditions in Home
afterwards.
In order to simplify the exposition, and derive tractable pencil and paper solutions, we shall
make several simplifying assumptions. The assumptions will be eased later, when we resort to
numerical simulations, with little effect as to the qualitative conclusions. One such assumption
is Assumption 1, which is made merely to simplify the exposition:
Assumption 1. In steady-state, there is no government consumption in Home or Foreign.
We allow for positive government consumption shocks in Home, but not in Foreign. If there
are such shocks in Home, they follow the same stochastic structure as the savings shock in For-
eign. [XXX This is fairly innocent assumption - in light of Giancarlo’s comment
I’d rather not emphasize it so much XXX]
2.1 Foreign
Under our assumptions, Foreign operates like a closed economy. The equilibrium dynamics
of output, y∗t , inflation, pi∗t , and nominal interest rates r∗t are driven by the dynamics of the
saving shock in Foreign, ξ∗t . We will specify a law of motion for the shock later. Conditional on
the dynamics of the shock, the evolution of the Foreign economy is captured by the following
three equations. The first is the dynamic IS-equation:
y∗t = Ety
∗
t+1 − (r∗t − Etpi∗t+1 + Et∆ξ∗t+1). (1)
Here Et is the expectations operator and ∆ marks the difference operator. Next, there is the
New Keynesian Phillips curve:
pi∗t = βEtpi
∗
t+1 + κ (ϕ+ 1) y
∗
t . (2)
Here β is the steady-state time-discount factor. κ := (1 − α)(1 − βα)/α measures the slope
of the Phillips curve, with α ∈ [0, 1) measuring the degree of price stickiness. ϕ > 0 is the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The last equation is an instrument rule for the
Foreign central bank that describes monetary policy. We assume that
r∗t = max{φpipi∗t − Et∆ξ∗t+1,−(1− β)}. (3)
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Here, φpi > 1 is the response to inflation in normal times. Foreign can become constrained by
the zero-lower-bound, however, explaining the max operator. As long as the central bank can
pursue rule (3) without being constrained by the ZLB, the time-discount factor shock does
not have an effect on Foreign inflation or output. In this case, monetary policy implements
the flexible price allocation under which the saving shock is fully absorbed by changes in the
real rate of interest. If, instead, policy becomes constrained the flexible-price allocation can
no longer be implemented by monetary policy (alone). In this case eqs. (1)–(2) restrict the
joint dynamics of output and inflation.
2.2 Home
While the dynamics in Foreign are independent of what happens in Home, Foreign does matter
for Home. The following set of equations describes the equilibrium dynamics in Home, given
the realization of Foreign variables. The dynamic IS-relation in Home is:
yt = Etyt+1 − (1−$)∆y∗t+1 −∆gˆt+1 + [1− υ −$] ∆ξ∗t+1 −$(rt − EtpiH,t+1). (4)
Here gˆt denotes government expenditure (in units of output). Government spending is fi-
nanced through lump-sum taxes and falls exclusively on domestically produced goods. In
deriving the above equation, we have substituted for Home consumer-price inflation rates.
Thus, what remains in the IS-equation is Home producer price inflation, piH,t. inflation
(based on Home producer prices). Parameter $ is defined as $ := 1 +υ(2−υ)(σ− 1), where
υ ∈ (0, 1), which measures the degree of openness, with a low υ implying a strong home bias,
and σ > 0, which measures the trade-price elasticity of international demand.
The New-Keynesian Phillips curve links inflation to expected inflation, as well as a number
of variables that determine the evolution of marginal costs in our small open economy
piHt = βEtpiHt+1 + κ
{(
ϕ+$−1
)
yt − $˜−1[(1−$)yˆ∗t + gˆt] +
1− υ −$
$
ξ∗t
}
. (5)
Note that both the dynamic IS-relation and the New Keynesian Phillips curve in Home are
a function of foreign output (that is the same as foreign consumption) as well as the Foreign
saving shock, which enter the equations as separate arguments. This is because a Foreign
saving shock spills over internationally through two channels. The first is a direct demand
channel: given prices, a saving shock leads to less Foreign demand for Home goods—this is the
key effect of a global recession that we wish to focus on in our analysis. The second channel
works through prices: because of home bias in consumption, for given relative prices the fall
in Foreign demand falls disproportionately on Foreign-produced goods. In equilibrium, the
relative price of Foreign-produced goods must fall, which in turn crowds out demand for Home
goods.
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In the following, we wish to focus on the demand channel. We do so by making the following
assumption:
Assumption 2. The parameters governing openness (υ) and the trade elasticity (σ) are
related as
1− σ = (2− υ)−1.
The above constraint implies 1 − υ − $ = 0, so that the Foreign savings shock disappears
from equations (4) and (5). In the numerical solutions of the model in section Section 4, we
will relax this constraint.
The terms of trade in Home, st, are defined as the price of imports relative to the price of
exports. Foreign being large the Foreign consumer price level equals the Foreign producer
price level. With the law of one price assumed to hold, and producer currency pricing, we
have that
st = et + p
∗
t − pH,t, (6)
where et is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of foreign currency in units of
domestic currency, p∗t is the (consumer and producer) price level in Foreign and pH,t is the
producer price level in Home. Note that piH,t = pH,t − pH,t−1 and pi∗t = p∗t − p∗t−1.
In equilibrium, demand for Home-produced goods satisfies
yt = (1− υ)st + gˆt + y∗t − (1− υ)ξ∗t . (7)
This is derived from goods market clearing for Home-produced goods using the risk shar-
ing condition under complete international financial markets.6 All else equal, Home output
depends positively on foreign demand, the terms of trade and Home government consumption.
The Home economy (and the full model) is closed by specifying the Home monetary policy
regime. We will, in the next section, consider three different scenarios: an independent
monetary policy in Home that follows the analog of the rule (3), with and without being
constrained by the ZLB, as well as the case of a currency peg.
In equilibrium, eqs. (4)–(7) determine a sequence Home variables {yt, piH,t, pH,t, st, et, rt, gˆt}∞t=0,
given a specification of (i) monetary policy in Home, (ii) fiscal policy in Home, (iii) piH,t =
pH,t − pH,t−1, (iv) the sequence {y∗t , pi∗t , p∗t , ξ∗t }∞t=0, as well as initial conditions (p∗−1, pH,−1).
6In our setup complete risk sharing does not imply equal consumption in Home and Foreign because of
home bias. Moreover, the saving shock will affect consumption-risk sharing, as it impacts the marginal utility
in Foreign.
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3 The impact of a global recession
In this section, we provide analytical insight on the transmission of a large external demand
shock to Home—a small open economy specialized in the production of a country-specific
varieties. We study, in particular, how the effects of the shock vary with the extent to
which monetary instruments in Home are constrained, either by the zero lower bound or by
a commitment to an exchange rate peg. Then, we turn to discussing how effectively fiscal
instruments can substitute for monetary ones in the respective regimes.
Throughout, we focus on the effect of the external saving shock that directly affects Foreign
households only. The effects of this shock on global demand and production, the world
interest rate and the prices produced abroad are endogenous to the world economy, but from
the vantage point of the (small) Home economy, they are exogenous, and so is the inward shift
in the world demand for the Home goods and the price drift in Foreign exports denoted in
Foreign currency. To ensure tractability, we assume that the shock follows a Markov structure.
Assumption 3. In the initial period, Foreign households become more patient, so that ξ∗t
drops to ξ∗L. Each period afterward, with probability µ ∈ (0, 1) ξ∗t will remain at that same
low level for another period, or otherwise permanently revert to the level of ξ∗t = 0.
We have particular, great recession, scenario in mind. Namely, one in which the demand
shock hits the Foreign economy when Foreign monetary policy does not respond to the shock,
for example, because the Foreign economy was at its zero lower bound to start with.
Assumption 4. The Foreign interest rate, r∗t , does not react to the demand shock while the
shock lasts.
Again, these restrictions will be relaxed in the next section, where we will resort to numerical
simulations.[XXX Again, in light of Giancarlo’s comment: I suggest we consolidate
Assumption 2 and 3 and label it “Great recession secnario”. I am not sure we
relax these “restrictions” in the numerical analysis XXX]
In addition, we make an assumption for both Home and Foreign. Throughout the paper,
we shall focus on cases only in which the equilibrium is determinate both in Foreign and in
Home:
Assumption 5. Parameters of the model are restricted to satisfy the determinacy conditions
in each scenario. [XXX Again: no need to state this as an assumption—this is
fairly common after all XXX]
With these assumptions, we get a unique representation of the dynamics of Foreign output
and Foreign prices. Output and inflation in Foreign inherit the Markov property of the savings
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shock, that is, they will look the same in any period in which the shock lasts. We use the
subscript “L” to indicate the value that endogenous variables take during the shock period.
With this in mind, the marginal impact of the shock on output in Foreign is given by
y∗L =
(1− βµ)(1− µ)
(1− βµ)(1− µ)− µκ(1 + ϕ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=1/χ>1
ξ∗L. (8)
It is important to note here that χ < 1 and decreasing in µ. In words, due to the ZLB
constraint binding in Foreign, the discount-factor shock has a disproportionate effect on For-
eign’s output. This effect tends to be stronger, the more persistent the shock is and the longer
Foreign monetary policy remains constrained.
Foreign inflation also falls in response to the shock:
pi∗L =
κ(1 + ϕ)(1− µ)
(1− βµ)(1− µ)− µκ(1 + ϕ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
ξ∗L. (9)
Having characterized the evolution of Foreign demand (output) and Foreign inflation, next
we take the vantage point of the small open Home economy. We will consider three types
of stabilization policies. In turn, we will assume that the Home monetary policy either
(i) features floating exchange rates and is unconstrained by the zero lower bound; (ii) is
constrained by the zero lower bound for a finite number of periods amid a floating exchange
rate; (iii) is constrained by a credible (and permanent) currency peg.
3.1 Unconstrained monetary policy under a floating rate regime in Home
We begin by revisiting, analytically, a classical result: under flexible exchange rates a small
open economy has the ability to stabilize the output gap and inflation in response to large
foreign demand shocks. It can do so through its own monetary policy, as long as this policy
remains unconstrained. To show this, we postulate that the Home monetary authorities is
able to implement a rule akin to that in Foreign, but unconstrained by the zero lower bound:
rt = φpiH,t + r
n
t , with φ > 1. (10)
where rnt is the natural rate of interest in Home. Under our shock scenario, r
n
t will be zero
after the shock has ceased. Otherwise,
rnL =
(1− µ)ϕ
1 + ϕ$
(υy∗L + gˆL) .
Here gˆL is the value that government consumption is assumed to take during the shock
episode. Monetary policy targets producer-price inflation and adjusts policy rates to changes
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in the natural rate of interest. Combining the interest rate rule specified above with equations
(4) and (5), determines the equilibrium outcome for the interest rate, inflation and output in
Home. The model, thus, shows the well-established isomorphism between open and closed-
economy settings, as is common in New Keynesian models (Clarida et al., 2001). This is not
to say that openness is irrelevant for Home. It matters for the Home economy through $
(the openness parameter υ). In addition, openness matters here as a source of shocks.
Provided that the central bank follows the rule above, our model yields a well-known result
in the literature (see, for instance, Gali, 2015, chapter 4): With complete markets and in the
absence of markup shocks, rule (10) above supports the flexible-price allocation. In particular,
there is no inflation (piH,t = 0) and output equals:
yL =
1
1 + ϕ(1− υ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
(υy∗L + gˆL) . (11)
Flexible exchange rates under stable producer prices partly isolate Home from the external
shock. The isolation in terms of output is not complete, though. Rather, monetary policy
stabilizes output at the natural level. Under the assumptions made above, the natural level
of output declines in response to the external shock. Still, the external-demand multiplier is
smaller than unity. Intuitively, it increases in the openness parameter υ (which determines
the share of imports-to-GDP in steady state). Only under complete openness (υ → 1) will
the Foreign shock be passed through completely.
It is instructive to analyze the accompanying movements in the terms of trade and the nominal
exchange rate. The following expression for the terms of trade can be derived by combining
the solution for output (11) with the market-clearing condition equation (7):
sL = −
[
1− χ+ υϕ
1 + ϕ(1− υ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
y∗L −
ϕ
1 + ϕ(1− υ) gˆ
∗
L. (12)
What is apparent from this is that the Home terms of trade automatically and unambiguously
depreciate if Foreign output—and hence external demand—declines. Expansionary govern-
ment spending in Home, all else equal, appreciates the Home terms of trade.
The following expression for the nominal exchange rate shows precisely how Home monetary
authorities can insulate the domestic economy against the fallout of the external demand
shock. From (6), the nominal exchange rate, et, is given by
et = st + pH,t − p∗t , (13)
As long as the Home monetary authority can and does pursue price stability in Home, we
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have pH,t = 0. In this case, taking first differences of equation (13) implies
∆et = ∆st − pi∗t .
Observe two things. First, the movement in the nominal exchange rate perfectly insulates
the Home economy from movements in Foreign inflation alone. In our shock scenario, the
nominal exchange rate will depreciate one-to-one with the continuing fall in Foreign’s price
level, at the disinflation rate pi∗L < 0. On top, in the initial period of the shock, and only in
that period, the nominal exchange rate will depreciate in excess of the Foreign deflationary
crawl, so as to accommodate the initial period’s depreciation of the terms of trade.
This clarifies the two dimensions along which, with monetary authorities pursuing a regime
of output gap stabilization and price stability, the nominal exchange rate performs its role of
shock absorber. First, it fully insulates agents’ expectations of domestic inflation from the
Foreign deflationary drift. Second, on impact, it depreciates with the fall in Foreign demand,
contributing to real depreciation, thus sustaining domestic employment and competitiveness.
While the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate for the sake of competitiveness will
be reversed once the shock ends (and st reverts back to zero), the same is not true of the
adjustments due to Foreign deflationary drift. The monetary rule (10) does not include an
exchange rate target, not even in the long run, hence there is no implicit commitment to keep
the domestic price level aligned with the Foreign one. Rather, the nominal exchange rate will
be depreciated permanently.
3.2 The zero lower bound constraint under floating rates in Home
In our second scenario, the exchange rate regime is still a float, but now also the Home mone-
tary policy rate are assumed to be constrained when the adverse shock in Foreign materializes.
Specially, we impose that Home policy rates are constant—for example, because Home had
been at its zero lower bound already—as long as the Foreign economy is in the shock state.
So, at least temporarily, the Home monetary authority is unable to cushion the foreign shock.
In this case the solution for Home output is given by:
yL =
(
1 +
µκϕ(1− υ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µκ(1 + ϕ(1− υ))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Ξ
(υy∗L + gˆL) . (14)
where one can show that
1 < Ξ <
1
υ
.
In other words, the external-demand multiplier is unambiguously larger than unity and thus
larger than absent ZLB constraint in Home, compare (14) with (11). Exchange rate flexibility
alone is not sufficient to insulate the Home economy from the Foreign demand shock.
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While the drop in Home output will never exceed the drop in Foreign output, with the ZLB
constraint the output loss due to an external demand shock can be large. The reason for
why the multiplier is large at the ZLB (and larger than absent the ZLB) has been extensively
explored by the literature, notably in the context of fiscal policy (e.g. Woodford, 2011). The
fall in Foreign demand drives down inflation and inflation expectations in a significant and
sustained way, causing a rise in (long-term) real interest rates (see also Cook and Devereux,
2014). Specifically, the the solution for inflation is given by:
piH,L =
(1− µ)κϕ
(1− βµ)(1− µ)− µκ(1 + ϕ(1− υ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(υy∗L + gˆL) . (15)
Next, we turn to the accompanying movements in the terms of trade and the nominal exchange
rate. The solution for the terms of trade for the duration of the shock is given by:
sL = − 1
(1− υ)
[
1− (1− υ)χ− Ξυ]y∗L− 1− Ξ(1− υ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
gˆL. (16)
It is instructive to compare this to the solution for the terms of trade when monetary policy
follows rule (10) in an unconstrained way, that is, by the expression in equation (12) above.
A close inspection of the terms multiplying foreign output reveals that the terms of trade
depreciate to a lesser extent in response to a drop of external demand when the ZLB binds in
Home. In fact, it is difficult to formally establish the sign of the terms of trade response to the
external shock. Still, in our numerical experiments we find the terms of trade to depreciate
consistently, even as the ZLB binds in Home.
Importantly, given the dampened response of the terms of trade at the zero lower bound,
expression (13) makes clear that the nominal exchange depreciates also less at the ZLB rel-
ative to the unconstrained case. Not only do the terms of trade depreciate less at the ZLB,
Home producer prices decline as well (and the response of Foreign inflation is independent of
monetary conditions on Home). This result is merely formalizing the notion that the nominal
exchange rate does not fulfill its role as a shock absorber, once monetary policy is constrained
by the ZLB. Still, one can show that Home will never fully import Foreign’s deflationary
crawl.
With monetary policy unable to cushion the shock, the question naturally arises if Home may
nonetheless stabilize the economy through fiscal policy. The expressions above directly speak
to this question (see expressions (14) and (15) above). In fact, assuming that government
spending is raised by gˆL for as long as the economy is in the shock state, we observe that
fiscal policy is quite effective in raising output. Remarkably, since υ < 1, the fiscal multiplier
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is always larger than the external-demand multiplier [XXX I seems we do not define
the external demand multiplier; is υy∗L external demand or y
∗
L? Above in (11), it
seem it is the former?? XXX]. We think of this result as a sort of “benign coincidence:”
if the conditions are such that, due to the ZLB, the effect of an external demand shock
is strongly amplified, under those very conditions fiscal policy becomes more effective in
stabilizing economic activity. In particular, to prevent a fall in current output per effect of a
drop in foreign demand by one percent of domestic GDP, the government needs to commit
resources for less than one percent of GDP.7
The mechanism underlying the power of fiscal policy at the zero lower bound is well under-
stood by now: higher government spending lowers real interest rates to the extent that fiscal
spending raises expected inflation and provided that its inflationary impact is not met by
higher policy rates (Christiano et al., 2011; Woodford, 2011). Relative to analyses conducted
in a close economy setting, our analysis sheds light on the additional contribution to stabiliza-
tion of the exchange rate as a shock absorber. Indeed, flexible exchange rates are important
element of the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the ZLB scenario, as the next section will make
clear.
3.3 An exchange-rate peg
We turn to our third, and final, scenario for monetary policy in Home. Namely, we assume
that monetary policy adjusts interest rates so as to ensure the following exchange rate target:
et = 0. (17)
Here we abstract from issues pertaining to implementation and from possible constraints on
monetary policy.8
To understand the implications of an exchange rate peg for the macroeconomic stabilization
of our small open Home economy, we derive an expression the evolution of the terms of trade.
The Home terms of trade are given by the expression in equation (13). With permanently
fixed exchange rates, this means
st − st−1 = pi∗t − piH,t. (18)
7Note, however, that while government spending may be used to effectively isolate Home from the external-
demand shock, this also alters the flexible-price allocation. As a result, at the ZLB it is not feasible to restore
the allocation which obtains in the unconstrained case through government spending. To see this, note that if
Home inflation is fully stabilized, Home output will not be at the natural level, but at the steady state level.
8See, for instance, Benigno et al. (2007). In the event of a binding ZLB constraint, one may think of an
appropriate commitment to future policy rates as a way to ensure the exchange rate peg. Recall that one
scenario we have in mind is the membership of a small open economy within a currency union.
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We may then subtract from the Phillips curve in Foreign (2) its Home counterpart (5) to
obtain
pi∗t − piH,t = βEt(pi∗t+1 − piH,t+1) + κ
(
χ[1 + ϕ(1− υ)]yˆ∗t − ϕgˆt − [1 + ϕ(1− υ)]st
)
. (19)
Organizing terms leads to the following second-order difference equation in the terms of trade:
st = ψst−1 + βψEtst+1 + κψ
[
χ[1 + ϕ(1− υ)]y∗t − ϕgˆt
]
, (20)
where ψ = [1 +β+κ(1 +ϕ(1−υ))]−1. Under our assumptions about the Markov structure of
shocks, one can solve this difference equation using the method of undetermined coefficients,
obtaining the stable solution:
st = δst−1 +
κψχ[1 + ϕ(1− υ)]
1− βψ[δ + µ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Φ
y∗t −
κψ
1− βψ[δ + µ]ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Γ
gˆt, (21)
where δ := 1−
√
1−4βψ2
2ψβ , with 0 < δ < 1, and Φ ∈ (0, χ), and Γ > 0. This expression serves
to make two important points. First, with fixed exchange rates, the sign of the effect of
government spending on the terms of trade is opposite to the sign that obtains under flexible
exchange rates absent the ZLB. In other words, government spending stimulus under fixed
exchange rates appreciates the terms of trade. This hinders its effectiveness as a stabilization
tool. The terms of trade unambiguously appreciate in response to the negative external
demand shock. This is in contrast with the results for flexible exchange rates, when there was
scope for the terms of trade to depreciate. Intuitively, with the nominal exchange rate fixed,
the adjustment of the terms of trade depends on the relative adjustment of prices in Home
and Foreign. It turns out that in response to the Foreign saving shock, Foreign prices decline
more than in Home—hence the real appreciation.
Two other dimensions set the fixed exchange rate regime apart from the flexible exchange
rate regime. First, if the Foreign demand shock persists, and so yL < 0, the terms of trade
will not only appreciate in first period of the shock but will continue to do so going forward.
Second, the terms of trade will not automatically reset once the Foreign shock ceases to exist.
Rather, the terms of trade appreciation of the small open Home economy will linger with
detrimental results on output and inflation even once the rest of the world no longer suffers
from the shock (and y∗t = 0). This can be best seen by iterating the expression for the terms
of trade backward in time, assuming that prior to the first period the terms of trade were at
their steady-state value (s−1 = 0):
st =
t∑
k=0
δt−k (Φy∗k − Γgˆk) . (22)
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In other words, fixed exchange rates not only mean reduced competitiveness upon a negative
foreign demand shock. Worse, fixed exchange rates can mean that these effects keep lingering
after the rest of the world has already recovered from the shock. Similarly, the effect of
reduced competitiveness that goes in hand with fiscal spending in Home will linger.
Last, we turn to effect of the Foreign shock on Home output. By equation (7), we have that
yt = (1− υ)st + (1− χ(1− υ))y∗t + gˆt.
Inserting the expression for the terms of trade under fixed exchange rates, we obtain:
yt = [1− (1− υ)χ]y∗t + (1− υ)
t∑
k=0
δt−kΦy∗k (23)
+ gˆt − (1− υ)Γ
t∑
k=0
δt−kgˆk. (24)
KK: I’ll need to double-check the proof tomorrow The impact of the external shock
on Home output will tend to be large in absolute terms. Indeed, one can show that on
impact output in Home will fall more in response to the foreign demand shock under the
peg than in the ZLB scenario discussed earlier. Under floating exchange rates, the terms of
trade change on impact. They are constant thereafter for as long as the negative demand
shock persists. Under the peg, instead, not only is the adverse effect of the shock on Home
output larger on impact, but also do the terms of trade continue to appreciate. Thus, for as
long as shock persists, Home output will be lower under the peg than under the float (with
or without ZLB). Since the demand shock persistently appreciates the terms of trade, then
output remains lower under the peg then under floating exchange rates. At the same time,
the spending multiplier is always smaller than one, and thereby smaller than under the ZLB.
The government will need to commit more resources, on a more than one-to-one basis, to
compensate for any given fall in output due to the external demand shock.
As analyzed in our previous work a credible exchange rate target amounts to a credible
commitment to anchoring the Home price level to that of the Foreign country in the medium
and long run (Corsetti et al., 2013a). In our scenario above, the Foreign country suffers
from a deep deflationary downturn. Hence, as the Home country pegs its own currency, it
anchors domestic expectations to a falling price level, causing domestic real interest rates to
rise substantially in tandem with the foreign one.
Not only does the anchor to the foreign price level implicit in a peg exacerbate the transmission
of the world recession. It is also the reason why fiscal stabilization is not particularly effective
under the peg. This is because any inflationary effects that government spending has in the
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short run are offset, over time, by the working of arbitrage in the goods market, causing
enough (relative) deflation in Home to re-establish PPP.
4 Quantitative illustration
We now turn to model simulations in order to illustrate the quantitative relevance of our
our results. In doing so, we also assess to what extent our results are robust to relaxing the
simplifying assumptions required to carry out our analytical derivations. For our numerical
experiments we adopt the following parameter values. Since a period in the model corresponds
to one quarter, the discount factor β is set to 0.99. We assume that the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, ϕ, takes the value of one. The trade price elasticity σ is set equal
to 2/3. Home is assumed to be relatively open, corresponding to υ = 0.3.9 The average
price duration is assumed to be four quarters, requiring the Calvo parameter to be set equal
to ξ = 0.75. Finally, we set the average share of government spending in Home GDP to 20
percent.
For the sake of clarity, we consider the dynamic adjustment to the foreign shock separately
from the dynamic adjustment to an increase in government spending. In the first experiment,
we look at a saving shock in Foreign that cannot be stabilized by foreign monetary policy
because of a zero-lower-bound problem. More specifically, we assume that the Foreign policy
interest rate is fixed for 10 periods. Afterwards monetary policy in Foreign targets price
stability (pi∗t = 0). We assume that the shock follows an AR(1) process with the persistence
parameter 0.5. This assumptions ensures that the ZLB in Foreign remains a binding constraint
for as long as the shock has a significant impact. In the second experiment, we consider an
increase of government consumption in Home, assuming again an AR(1) process and set the
persistence parameter to 0.9. In all instances, we contrast the adjustment under the three
policy scenarios analyzed above: an unconstrained monetary policy; the case in which the
interest rate does not respond to the shock for 10 periods; and the case of a currency peg.
4.1 Domestic implications of a global recession
In Figure 2, we look at the transmission of the Foreign savings shock, which causes a sharp
and persistent contraction in Foreign consumption and inflation (not shown). In each panel
vertical axes measure deviations from the pre-shock path, in percent of steady-state output
(in case of quantities) or percent (in case of prices). From the vantage point of the small open
9These assumptions imply that the restriction imposed on the σ and υ which imposed in our analytical
derivations is not satisfied. Yet it turns out that our simulation results are fully in line with our analytical
results. They also hold for a wide range of alternative values for σ and υ.
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Figure 2: Adjustment to one-percent drop of external demand: unconstrained monetary
policy in Home (dashed line) vs constant-interest-rate period of 10 quarters (solid line) and
exchange rate peg (dash-dotted line). Horizontal axes measure time in quarters. Vertical
axes measure deviations from the pre-shock path, in percent of steady state output (in case
of quantities) or percent (in case of prices).
economy, the shock translates into a sharp fall in the external demand (upper-left panel).
In equilibrium, the shock generates financial inflows corresponding to an external deficit in
the trade balance (depicted in lower-right panel). Contrasting the three scenarios for Home
monetary policy, we find the impact of the shock on Home output most adverse under a peg
(marked by a dash-dotted line in the figure), intermediate under a float but with policy rates
fixed for 10 quarters (solid line), and minimal under a float with an unconstrained monetary
policy (dashed line). Our simulation also suggests that the differences across scenarios are
quantitatively relevant.
Several aspects of the transmission mechanism are noteworthy. Starting from the scenario
of unconstrained monetary policy (dashed line), observe that under a floating exchange rate
regime the contraction in economic activity is only marginal. It turns out that the Home
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country is able to insulate its economy from the external shocks via a large, upfront cut
in interest rates (2nd row, left panel), associated to a large depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate (2nd row, right panel). Internal demand (3rd row, middle panel) actually rises
at the margin, since a regime of price stability means that expectations of inflation remain
firmly anchored and the long-term real rate, relevant to the consumption decisions, falls
substantially with the current and anticipated monetary stance. Despite nominal depreciation
and weakening terms of trade (3rd row, left panel), the contraction in external demand causes
a trade deficit. By pursuing price stability, monetary policy effectively tilts aggregate demand
towards domestic consumption.
Exchange rate flexibility plays a crucial role also when Home monetary policy is constrained by
the zero lower bound. The economic outlook worsens relative to that under an unconstrained
monetary policy, since insufficient short-term monetary stimulus means that domestic demand
remains inefficiently low. But the depth of the Foreign contraction and deflation translates
into a Home permanent nominal depreciation. The exchange rate thus weakens the link with
the deflationary drift in Foreign: dynamically, the Home price level falls somewhat (2nd row,
middle panel), but not as strongly as in Foreign. The real exchange rate depreciates and the
terms of trade worsens, although by less than in the previous case—net exports deteriorate
by more. The contraction in both the internal and external demand causes sizeable drop in
output.
Because of deflation in Foreign, the worst performing regime is the currency peg. If the
foreign country were not at the ZLB and, hence, suffered no deflationary drift, a peg would
in fact have desirable features. Indeed, to the extent that a credible peg is an implicit
commitment to a stable price level, the transmission of domestic adverse demand shocks
would be muted, because any short run fall in domestic prices associated with such shocks
would in the medium and long run be offset by positive inflation (Corsetti et al., 2013a).
When the Foreign country is at the ZLB, and the shock is a demand shock that originates
in Foreign, instead, this conclusion is turned on its head. The implicit domestic commitment
under a peg to follow the unstable foreign price level works perversely and amplifies the
domestic downturn, by generating expectations of sustained domestic deflation. The terms of
trade actually appreciate, exacerbating the contraction of domestic net exports in response
to the shock to foreign demand.
4.2 The scope for fiscal stabilization
Figure 3 traces the effect of an increase of government spending (itself depicted in the upper-
left panel). In the case of a free float, as long as monetary policy is unconstrained, the fiscal
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expansion has moderate effects. With the monetary authority ensuring price stability, more
government spending leads to a monetary contraction and real appreciation. It raises output,
but only at the cost of crowding out domestic consumption and net exports. The multiplier
is substantially below one. Conversely, fiscal policy is quite powerful when the domestic
policy rates are temporarily constant at the ZLB. Persistently higher government spending
raises expected inflation, thus lowering the long-term real rate: private consumption rises
substantially. At the same time, the fall in long-term rates causes the nominal exchange rate
to depreciate. Domestic consumption rises with domestic inflation. In addition, net exports
rise on the back of real depreciation. Comparing the ZLB case across the Figures 2 and 3
illustrates the “benign coincidence” discussed above: under those circumstances in which the
external shocks become more damaging because of the constraint on monetary policy, fiscal
policy is a powerful substitute for monetary stabilization.
In a world recession at the zero lower bound, the benign coincidence breaks down when the
country pursues a currency peg. The graphs in the figure shows that—contrary to conven-
tional wisdom—fiscal policy is not particularly effective in a fixed exchange rate regime, that
is, precisely in the one regime where the adverse external shock is most consequential for
Home output and consumption —compare, again, Figures 2 and 3. The mechanism harness-
ing the transmission of fiscal policy, as discussed in Corsetti et al. (2013a), is illustrated by
the panel in the middle of the figure: by the working of PPP in the medium and the long run,
under a peg, the initial positive response of inflation to a government spending expansion,
is offset over time: the price level reverts back to the initial level, which coincides with the
price level in Foreign. This is in sharp contrast with the ZLB scenario under flexible exchange
rate. There, the Home price level keeps increasing over the entire life of the fiscal expansion.
Under a peg, the overall monetary stance, measured by the rise in the long-term real rates,
therefore, is less rather than more accommodative than under a float with a ZLB; and the
fiscal multiplier is correspondingly lower.
4.3 Financial frictions and sovereign risk
So far we have proceeded under the assumption of frictionless financial markets, both within
a country and across borders. This assumption is necessary in order to obtain the closed-
form results discussed in the previous section, but is also consequential for macroeconomic
dynamics. In what follows, we perform a sensitivity analysis and relax the assumption of
complete financial markets. We posit that cross-border trade is limited to non-contingent
nominal bonds, and, in addition, we consider the possibility that Home is vulnerable to a
deterioration in the agents’s assessment of sovereign risk.
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Figure 3: Effect of domestic government spending increase: unconstrained monetary policy
(dashed line) vs constant-interest-rate period of 10 quarters (solid line) and exchange rate
peg (dash-dotted line). Horizontal axes measure time in quarters. Vertical axes measure
deviations from the pre-shock path, in percent of steady state output (in case of quantities)
or percent (in case of prices).
Drawing on our previous work (Corsetti et al., 2013b, 2014), we assume that sovereign risk is
increasing as public debt builds up. Higher sovereign risk, in turn, induces a rise of borrowing
costs in the private sector (see also Bocola, forthcoming). This specification entails that
sovereign risk premia result in a contraction of aggregate demand and therefore a drop in
current economic activity, independently of whether sovereign default actually takes place
or not. We provide some details on the modified model in Appendix A.5. Throughout we
continue to assume that Home is small.
Using the extended model, we first establish that, in our parameterization, the propagation of
the external-demand shock (triggered by Foreign saving shock) is not fundamentally different
if we move from the complete-market economy to an economy where there is trade in nominally
non-contingent bonds only. With cross-border trade in non-contingent assets, whether or not
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Figure 4: Adjustment to one-percent drop of external demand under incomplete international
financial markets; unconstrained monetary policy in Home (dashed line) vs constant-interest-
rate period of 10 quarters (solid line) and exchange rate peg (dash-dotted line); see Figure 2
for details.
markets price sovereign risk, the transmission of a world great recession is least damaging
under a float and price stability, most damaging under a peg—the zero lower bound being
the intermediate case.
Figure 4 shows the dynamic adjustment in case of incomplete markets, absent sovereign risk.
Under our parameterization, the difference between the complete and incomplete market
economy is trivial.10 Intuitively, the global shock we place at the core of our analysis is
temporary. Self-insurance via intertemporal trade in bonds and the equilibrium response of
the terms of trade and the real interest rate at global level allow a small open economy to
10A qualitative difference worth mentioning concerns the response of net exports and consumption under a
float with an unconstrained monetary policy. In the complete markets model, the saving shock in the Foreign
country generates a larger financial inflow into the Home country. Correspondingly, Home consumption rises,
if only at the margin, and the exchange rate depreciates. The capital inflow is less pronounced in the bond
economy. Home consumption falls, while a more pronounced depreciation produces a small trade surplus over
time.
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achieve an allocation that is not too far from that with perfect risk sharing.
Sovereign risk has only a moderate effect on the transmission of external shocks—including
the sovereign risk channel in the model results in a mild amplification of the adverse business
cycle disturbances. Since numerical results are quite similar to Figure 4, we omit a graph but
focus instead on summarizing the qualitative differences in our findings. Namely, relative to
the previous experiment, as output collapses in response to the external shock, government
debt builds up due to the working of the automatic stabilizers. The fiscal outlook worsens,
affecting the probability of default. Markets, in turn, call for a higher sovereign risk premium
which impacts private borrowing conditions adversely. This reduces aggregate demand and
activates an adverse loop: lower demand translates into lower activity, hence higher deficits
and debt; higher debt raises sovereign risk and borrowing costs further.11
There is however one dimension in which the sovereign risk channel is most consequential. This
is the transmission and effectiveness of fiscal stabilization, which may be eroded by a loss of
confidence in fiscal stability when the government pursues deficit-financed expansions. Figure
5 shows the adjustment to an increase of Home government consumption by one percent of
GDP. The left column shows the responses of the economy under the float and unconstrained
Home monetary policy. The middle column corresponds to a float with the ZLB constraint
binding in Home. The panels on the right show the responses under the permanent peg. In
each of the panels, a solid line marks the responses that would prevail absent the sovereign
risk channel. The dashed line marks the responses with sovereign risk.
Focus on the panels in the fifth row, which show the response of consumption. Across the three
scenarios for monetary policy, sovereign risk amplifies the crowding out effect of government
spending on domestic demand. There is crowding out even at the zero lower bound, whereas
in the model without the sovereign risk channel prospective inflation from public demand
would crowd-in consumption (see Figure 3 above). Somewhat surprisingly, however, economic
activity is not necessarily lower with sovereign risk (4th row). It is relatively stronger in the
case of a float and price stability; it also becomes stronger over time in the other two scenarios
in the figure. What drives this result is the dynamics of net exports (bottom row), which
record large surpluses in all cases, either on impact (if exchange rates are flexible) or over
time (under a peg), clearly helped by a large real depreciation (3rd row).
The consequences of sovereign risk for the exchange rate and economic dynamics is the sub-
11Under a float and an unconstrained monetary policy, sovereign risk causes more current and/or future
monetary accommodation, reflected by exchange rate depreciation upfront. Although consumption falls, it
actually falls by less than in the absence of foreign risk—net exports are correspondingly lower. Monetary
accommodation and upfront depreciation is instead lower in the ZLB case: the fall in consumption is now more
pronounced than in the absence of sovereign risk, making room for a stronger net export dynamic. Under a
peg, sovereign risk exacerbates and magnify the effects under the ZLB scenario.
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Figure 5: Effect of increase of government spending in Home w/ (dashed line) and w/o (solid
line) sovereign risk: see Figure 3 for details; international financial markets assumed to be
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ject of a small but significant debate. Based on its consequences on the exchange rate,
Krugman (2014) strongly argues that prospective sovereign risk should not be used as an
argument against the use of countercycical fiscal policy. If interest rates rise with a fiscal
expansion—Krugman argues—their negative effects on output will be offset by a large de-
preciation boosting external demand. Figure 5 substantiates but also qualifies Krugman’s
view.
Under a float, our results appear to lend support to Krugman (2014): the output multiplier
of public spending is actually larger with sovereign risk. Nonetheless, it is worth stressing
that the stronger expansion of output is accompanied by a sharp deterioration of domestic
consumption—i.e., it corresponds to a sharp change in the composition of aggregate demand,
whereas a boom in exports more than offset a contraction of internal component. The output
expansion is largest when the policy rate is not constrained by the zero lower bound, since
the central bank can engineer a stronger response to the collapse in internal demand, less
pronounced when monetary policy is constrained. While a smaller monetary accommodation
at the zero lower bound means less depreciation, the exchange rate still adjusts sharply
upfront, favoring large external surpluses. These offset the crowding out effects of government
spending on domestic demand via the sovereign risk channel (i.e. high private borrowing
costs). Under a peg, there is no depreciation, hence the spending multiplier becomes very
small.
Our reconsideration of the argument by Krugman—that sovereign risk can be expansionary—
indeed clarifies that, first, the extent of exchange rate depreciation eventually reflects the
degree of monetary accommodation. Second, while effective in preventing a contraction in
economic activity, fiscal stimulus cannot prevent (actually it causes) a contraction in internal
demand and deflation. In light of this observation, and especially given the limits of our
understanding of financial and fiscal crises, the arguments for dynamic budget correction and
policies maintaining a stable fiscal outlook remain strong.
The strong response of net export to government expansion is also noteworthy in light of
the ongoing controversy on currency war. Our model suggests that, in a sovereign risk crisis,
even fiscal stabilization—typically targeted to sustain internal demand—tends to increase net
saving in the economy, and require currency depreciation to be effective.
In the previous section, we have entertained the notion that the stabilization of large external
shocks under flexible exchange rates may rely on a “benign coincidence”: absent sovereign
risk, fiscal policy becomes most effective when monetary policy is constrained by the zero
lower bound. This benign coincidence breaks down in a currency peg, and becomes much less
favorable and reliable in the presence of sovereign risk.
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5 Conclusion
The risk of large global shocks causing once again the world to fall in a great recession is a
challenge to policymaking in small open economies, which may be particularly vulnerable to
external shocks. In this paper we have drawn on the recent literature to provide a stylized
synthetic discussion of the effectiveness of different policy options in such circumstances,
across alternative exchange rate regime. Qualifying features of our analysis are, first, the fact
that we analyze alternative policies and regimes in a small open economy against the same
background—a world saving shock causing a collapse of aggregate demand and a deflationary
crawl, with the world policy rates to reach their zero lower bound. Second, in reassessing the
relative importance of fiscal and monetary instruments, we explicitly account for potential
constraints on either, in the form of a zero lower bound constraint on domestic monetary
policy, or concerns with sovereign risk crises limiting the expansionary effects of fiscal stimulus.
By doing so, we are able to emphasize the specific way in which a flexible exchange rates
can act as shock absorbers in circumstances that, after the global crisis, may re-occur in the
near future. Key to our results is the ability of policymakers to delink their economy from
the deflationary crawl that may aﬄict the world economy in a great recession. This requires
Home policymakers to manage a depreciation drift in the Home nominal exchange rate, on
top and above the nominal and real depreciation needed to buffer the collapse in external
demand.
Constraints on monetary policy raise the value of fiscal policy, but again this turns out to
be effective only as long as the monetary regime can accompany fiscal stimulus with enough
monetary accommodation, and the exchange rate regime can insulate the evolution of the
domestic price level from the price level abroad. For this reason, fiscal policy turns out
to be particularly effective when domestic rates are at the zero lower bound, but not in a
peg. Modern monetary theory indeed questions the conventional wisdom from the textbook
rendition of the Mundell-Fleming model, that fiscal policy is a reliable alternative to monetary
policy in a currency peg or a monetary union. This is especially so, when policymakers face
the risk of a loss of confidence in the debt market, eventually affecting the borrowing costs
and conditions faced by all private agents, firms and households, residing in the country.
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A A New Keynesian open-economy model
Our model is a simplified version of the two-country model put forward in Corsetti et al.
(2012), as we abstract from investment and wage rigidities. Home trades with the rest of the
world, consolidated in a Foreign country. Both countries produce a variety of country-specific
intermediate goods, with the number of intermediate good producers normalized to unity.
A fraction n of firms is located in Home, the remaining firms (n, 1] is located in Foreign.
Analogously, Home accounts for a fraction n ∈ [0, 1] of the global population. Intermediate
goods are traded across borders while final goods,which are bundles of intermediate goods, are
not. Prices of intermediate goods are sticky in producer-currency terms. Households supply
labor services only within the country where they reside, but trade assets internationally. For
the sake of analytical tractability, in our baseline, they will trade a complete set of state-
contingent assets.
Many of the features of the model are standard, so we keep the exposition short. We focus our
exposition on Home. When necessary, we refer to foreign variables by means of an asterisk.
A.1 Households
There is a representative household in each country. Letting Ct denote a consumption basket
(defined below) and Ht labor supply, the objective of the household is
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
(eξt+kβk)
(
lnCt+k −
H1+ϕt+k
1 + ϕ
)
, (25)
where ξt is a zero-mean shock to the time-discount factor, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor,
and ϕ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
In our baseline, the household trades a complete set of state-contingent securities with the
rest of the world. Letting Xt+1 denote the payoff in units of domestic currency in period t+ 1
of the portfolio held at the end of period t, the budget constraint of the household is given by
Et {ρt,t+1Xt+1} − Xt = (1− τ)(WtHt + Υt)− Tt − PtCt.
Here ρt,t+1 is the nominal stochastic discount factor. Wt is the nominal wage. Υt are the
domestic firms’ nominal profits. τ is a constant tax rate, Tt are lump-sum taxes. Pt is the
price index for the final consumption basket. The consumption baskets themselves are not
traded across borders. Their components are, however. The baskets consist of bundles At
and Bt of, respectively, domestically and foreign produced intermediate goods. The final
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consumption basket Ct (C
∗
t ) is produced using the following aggregation technology
Ct =
{
[(1− (1− n)υ)] 1σ A
σ−1
σ
t + [(1− n)υ)]
1
σ B
σ−1
σ
t
} σ
σ−1
, (26)
C∗t =
{
[nυ]
1
σ (A∗t )
σ−1
σ + [(1− nυ)] 1σ (B∗t )
σ−1
σ
} σ
σ−1
, (27)
where σ measures the terms of trade elasticity of the relative demand for domestically pro-
duced goods and υ ∈ [0, 1] measures the home bias.12
The bundles of domestically and imported intermediate goods are defined as follows
At =
[(
1
n
) 1

∫ n
0
At(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
, Bt =
[(
1
1− n
) 1

∫ 1
n
Bt(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
, (28)
where At(j) and Bt(j) denote intermediate goods produced in Home and Foreign, respectively,
and  measures the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods produced within the
same country.
The household minimizes expenditures subject to (26) and (28). Specifically, let Pt(j) denote
the price of an intermediate good expressed in domestic currency and Et the nominal exchange
rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency). We assume that the law
of one price holds, so that
EtP ∗t (j) = Pt(j). (29)
The household’s expenditure minimization implicitly defines a demand function for intermedi-
ate goods. Assuming that government consumption, Gt, is a bundle isomorphic to final goods,
but consisting of domestically produced goods only, global demand for a generic intermediate
good produced in Home and Foreign is, respectively:
Y Dt (j) =
(
Pt(j)
PHt
)−{(PHt
Pt
)−σ [ (1− (1− n)υ)Ct
+(1− n)υQσt C∗t
]
+Gt
}
, (30)
Y Dt (j)
∗ =
(
P ∗t (j)
P ∗Ft
)−{(P ∗Ft
P ∗t
)−σ [
nυQ−σt Ct + (1− nυ)C∗t
]}
, (31)
where price indices are given by
PHt =
[
1
n
∫ n
0
Pt(j)
1−dj
] 1
1−
, PFt =
[
1
1− n
∫ 1
n
Pt(j)
1−dj
] 1
1−
, (32)
12This specification follows Sutherland (2005) and De Paoli (2009). With υ = 1, there is no home bias: if the
relative price of foreign and domestic goods is unity, the fraction of domestically produced goods which ends
up in the production of final goods is equal to n, while imports account for a share of 1−n. Importantly, final
goods are identical across countries in this case. A lower value of υ implies that the fraction of domestically
produced goods in final goods exceeds the share of domestic production in the world economy. If υ = 0, there
is full home bias and no trade across countries.
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Pt =
[
(1− (1− n)υ)P 1−σHt + ((1− n)υ)P 1−σFt
] 1
1−σ , (33)
P ∗t =
[
nυ (P ∗Ht)
1−σ + (1− nυ) (P ∗Ft)1−σ
] 1
1−σ
, (34)
and
Qt =
EtP ∗t
Pt
(35)
measures the real exchange rate.
A.2 Firms
Intermediate goods producers sell under monopolistic competition, facing the demand func-
tion (30). The production function is Cobb-Douglas:
Yt(j) = Ht(j) (36)
where Ht(j) denotes labor services employed by firm j ∈ [0, n] in period t.
We assume that prices are set in the currency of the producer and that price setting is
constrained exogenously a` la Calvo, so that in each period only a fraction of intermediate
good producers (1− α) may adjust its price. When firm j has the opportunity, it sets P˜t(j)
to maximize the expected discounted value of net profits:
max
P˜t(j)
∞∑
k=0
αt+kEtρt,t+k
{
P˜t(j)Y
D
t+k(j)−Ψ
[
Y Dt+k(j)
]}
subject to the demand function (30) and the production function (36); Ψ
[
Y Dt+k(j)
]
mea-
sures costs. Domestic households own the firms, so profits are discounted with the domestic
households’ stochastic discount factor.
A.3 Monetary and fiscal policy
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by adjusting the short-term nominal interest
rate:
Rt ≡ 1/Etρt,t+1.
As regards fiscal and budget policy, we assume that Home government spending falls on an
aggregate of domestic intermediate goods only. We also posit that intermediate goods are
assembled so as to minimize costs. Thus the price index for government spending is given by
PH,t. In the first part of the paper, without loss of generality, we assume that the government
budget is balanced in each period by means of lump-sum taxes Tt. In the second part of the
paper, we will consider a richer specification, so as to account for the possibility of sovereign
risk.
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A.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, firms and households optimally choose prices and quantities subject to their
respective constraints and initial conditions while markets clear. At the level of inter-
mediate goods we have Yt(j) = Yt(j)
D. Defining an index for aggregate output Yt =(∫ 1
0 Y
−1

t (j)dj
) 
−1
, we obtain
Yt =
(
PHt
Pt
)−σ
[(1− (1− n)υ)Ct + (1− n)υQσt C∗t ] +Gt. (37)
Labor markets clear if
Ht =
∫ n
0
Ht(j)dj (38)
Finally, asset markets clear by Walras’ law.
In our analysis we below, we focus on the limiting case n → 0 for the size of the domestic
economy:
Yt =
(
PHt
Pt
)−σ
[(1− υ)Ct + υQσt C∗t ] +Gt,
Y ∗t = C∗t .
This makes the Home economy de facto a small open economy. Foreign, instead, operates
like a closed economy. But – importantly – it may be a source of shocks for Home.
A.5 Incomplete financial markets
We also consider a variant of the model where financial markets are incomplete. Specifically,
we in the modified model, we restrict asset trade to nominally non-contingent bonds only.
Moreover, we relax the assumption that government debt is neutral and allow it to impact
the economy through the sovereign risk channel. Denote with Dt the stock of nominal debt
issued by the fiscal authorities, assumed to have a maturity of one period. The period budget
constraint of the government reads as follows:
QD,tDt = Dt−1[1− δI(default in t+ 1)] +Gt − τYt − Tt, (39)
where δ > 0 is the fixed haircut that the government applies to private holders of its own
debt in those states of the world in which it defaults. I(default in t + 1) is the indicator
function that takes a value of one in case the government defaults and is zero otherwise. As
in Corsetti et al. (2013b), the probability of default in period t, pt, may increase in the level
of debt relative to steady-state output according to the following random function:
pt = Fbeta
(
Dt
4Y
1
d
;αbg , βbg
)
. (40)
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Here d denotes the upper end of the support for the debt-to-GDP ratio and Fbeta marks the
CDF of the beta distribution. That is, from an ex ante perspective, the government applies
the haircut δ in the next period with probability pt+1. With the opposite probability, the
government will comply with its promises to pay.
Finally, we postulate that lump-sum taxes adjust to stabilize debt in the following way:
Tt = φdDt, with φd > 1− β.
Households trade two discount bonds on international financial markets, one paying one unit
of domestic currency in the next period, the other one unit of foreign currency. Specifically,
letting Bt denote the domestic-currency bond and B
∗
t the foreign-currency bond, traded at
price QB,t and QB∗,t, respectively, the budget constraint of a household in Home reads as
follows
QB,tBt +QB∗,tB
∗
t Et + PtCt = (1− τ)Yt − Tt +Bt−1 +B∗t−1Et, (41)
where τ is a constant tax rate.
For tractability, we assume that sovereign default is possible only in the Home country and
that the marginal investor in sovereign bonds is a small mass of risk-neutral investors in
Foreign. Since Home bonds are subject to both outright sovereign default (a haircut), and
the risk of changes in the price of currencies, the bond price schedule is
QD,t = βEt {[1− δI(default in t+ 1)] Et/Et+1} . (42)
Sovereign default risk in the Home country, in turn, is assumed to spill over to private-sector
bond prices as follows
QB,t = R
−1
t Et[1− ηδI(default in t+ 1)], QB∗,t = βEt[1− ηδI(default in t+ 1]. (43)
where the parameter η ≥ 0 captures the degree of spillover of sovereign risk into private
borrowing. Following Corsetti et al. (2013b) we rationalize a value of η larger than zero
by the observation that private-sector contracts may not be fully enforced in the event of a
sovereign default.13 Importantly, however, we assume that even though lenders may not be
fully serviced in the event of sovereign default, borrowers may not retain resources either.
Rather, resources are lost in the process.14
We reconsider our earlier experiments in our modified model, based on simulations through-
out. For this purpose we rely on a first order approximation to the equilibrium conditions
13Specification (43) follows Kriwoluzky et al. (2015).
14Hence, whether the sovereign defaults or not has no direct bearing on the household’s budget constraint.
Otherwise, borrowers’ interest rate would rise with sovereign risk only notionally, not affecting behaviour up
to first order, as explained in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009). Bocola (forthcoming) models the pass-through of
sovereign risk while explicitly accounting for financial intermediation.
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around a deterministic steady state. As before, there is no debt and inflation in steady state.
The strength of the sovereign risk channel is captured three sets of parameters: the sensitivity
of Fbeta to the debt level (how steeply the default risk rises in debt), the size of the haircut
in the event of default, δ, and the spillover parameter η. Eventually, our assumptions imply
that an increase of sovereign debt by one percent of GDP, raises the interest rates faced by
the private sector by half a basis point. This corresponds to a scenario of severe fiscal stress,
according to our earlier work (Corsetti et al., 2013b). We ensure stationarity by assuming
that the private-sector interest rate is also elastic in the net foreign asset position of the
private sector (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003).
B System of linear difference equations
A linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions of the complete markets model yields
the following system of expectational difference equations. Small letters indicate the log
deviation of a variable from its steady-sate value. We first focus on the baseline model
allowing for n ∈ [0, 1].
B.1 Baseline
Households supply labor according to
w˜t = ϕht + ct +
τ
1− τ τ˜t (B.1)
w˜∗t = ϕh
∗
t + c
∗
t +
τ
1− τ τ˜
∗
t , (B.2)
where w˜t is the (consumption) real wage. The optimal time path of consumption satisfies:
ct = Et(ct+1)− (it − Etpit+1) (B.3)
c∗t − ξ∗t = Et(c∗t+1 − ξ∗t+1)− (i∗t − Etpi∗t+1). (B.4)
Under complete financial markets, we have the following risk-sharing condition:
(ct − ξt)− (c∗t − ξ∗t ) = qt = (1− υ)st. (B.5)
Intermediate good firms’ price-setting behavior is given by
piAt = βEtpiAt+1 + κmct (B.6)
pi∗Bt = βEtpi
∗
Bt+1 + κmc
∗
t , (B.7)
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where marginal costs are given by
mct = w˜t − qH,t (B.8)
mc∗t = w˜
∗
t − q∗F,t. (B.9)
The aggregate production function is given by
yt = ht (B.10)
y∗t = h
∗
t . (B.11)
Relative prices satisfy
piHt = qHt − qHt−1 + pit (B.12)
pi∗Ft = q
∗
Ft − q∗Ft−1 + pi∗t , (B.13)
as well as
−qt + qHt = q∗Ht (B.14)
−qt + qFt = q∗Ft. (B.15)
From the definition of the real exchange rate we have
qFt − qFt−1 = det + pi∗t − pit + q∗Ft − q∗Ft−1. (B.16)
Deflated price indices
0 = (1− (1− n)ω)qHt + (1− n)ωqFt (B.17)
0 = (1− nω)q∗Ft + nωq∗Ht. (B.18)
Finally, there is market clearing:
yt =(1− n)υ(cyc∗t + σcyqt)− σcyqHt + (1− (1− n)υ)cyct + (1− cy)gt (B.19)
y∗t =nυ(ct − σqt)− σq∗Ft + (1− nυ)c∗t . (B.20)
B.2 Incomplete markets model
The incomplete markets model assumes n → 0, that is, Home is small. Instead of the risk-
sharing condition B.5, equilibrium require the following UIP condition to hold:
rt − r∗t = Etet+1 − et.
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Also, we need to keep track private-sector bond holds. Assuming that foreign-currency bonds
are in zero net supply we have:
βbˆt + cˆt = bˆt−1 + (1− τ)yt − cˆt − cyqH,t − tˆt. (B.21)
(B.22)
If the sovereign risk-channel is operative, we need to keep track of government debt:
βdˆrt+1 = dˆ
r
t + gˆt − tˆrt − τyt (B.23)
tˆt = ψddˆt. (B.24)
Here the second equation determines the adjustment of taxes to debt. Eventually, the
sovereign risk channel alters the Euler equation in Home
ct = E(ct+1 − (it − Etpit+1 + χdt + γbˆt),
where χ captures the pass-through of sovereign risk (which rises in public debt) into private
borrowing conditions; γ makes the effective interest rate dependent on the net foreign asset
position.
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